May 29

Who were Late Modern Philosophers that aided in the theories behind Epistemology?

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I need the names of a few Philosophers who have good works about Epistemology from the Late Modern Era (The time when names like Soren Kierkegaard were still around). Also, if you know any other names from other Eras, let me know as well, but I need a Philosopher from the Late Modern Era specifically for a paper I have due on Epistemology.

Date May 29th, 2009 Filed in Epistemology Q&A
2 Comments »

2 Responses to “Who were Late Modern Philosophers that aided in the theories behind Epistemology?”

  1. Idontknow Says:
    April 6th, 2008 at 10:03 am

    The person that I will suggest is soooo modern that she is actually still alive and teaching ( I think shes philosophy professor at UC BerkeIey).

    However, I will first tell you why I am compelled to answer your question in such a long and winded way. I took Philosophical Epistemology in college and wrote an A paper on a philosopher who has revolutionized epistemology from being a white-male dominated philosophical area of study to one of understanding situational knowledge and the “salience of gender” which is grounds for a strong feminist, racial, economic class-based, and other different situations for knowledge and questioning past justifications.

    Her name is Phyllis Rooney.

  2. joseph Says:
    April 7th, 2008 at 5:30 am

    My choice is Edmund Gettier

    Since Plato’s Theaetetus there has been a tradition of defining knowledge as true belief plus a logos or reason. In the most familiar form, knowledge is justified true belief. In 1963 the American philosopher Edmund Gettier provided a range of counterexamples to this formula. In his cases a belief is true, and the agent is justified in believing it. But the justification does not relate to the truth of the belief in the right way, so that it is relatively accidental, or a matter of luck, that the belief is true. For example, I see what I reasonably and justifiably take to be an event of your receiving a bottle of whisky and on this basis I believe you drink whisky. The truth is that you do drink whisky, but on this occasion you were in fact taking delivery of a medical specimen. In such a case my belief is true and justified, but I do not thereby know that you drink whisky, since this truth is only accidental relative to my evidence. The counterexamples sparked a prolonged debate over the kinds of condition that might be substituted to give a better account of knowledge, or whether all suggestions would meet similar problems.

    peace and love

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